ABSTRACT Physical layer secure key generation (PL-SKG) schemes have received a lot of attention from the wireless security community in recent years because of the potential benefits that they could bring to the security landscape. These schemes aim to strengthen current security protocols by reducing the amount of key material that devices need for deployment. They do this by harnessing the common source of randomness provided by the wireless channel that the physical layer is communicating over. This is of particular importance in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) where resources are particularly scarce and where issues, such as key revocation and recovery make the design of efficient key management schemes extremely difficult. This paper discusses the issues and challenges encountered in the design and implementation of PL-SKG schemes on off-the-shelf WSNs. It then proposes a novel key generation scheme that takes advantage of both the power and simplicity of classic error correcting codes and also the diversity of frequency channels available on 802.15.4 compliant nodes to generate keys from received signal strength readings. This paper shows that our key generation and refreshment scheme can achieve a near 100% key reconciliation rate whilst also providing perfect forward and backward security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have grown in popularity over the last few decades because of their relatively low cost and their ease of deployment but such networks pose significant design challenges because of their limited computational prowess and their short battery life [1] , [2] . In the context of wireless security, WSNs pose significant challenges because their limited capabilities render conventional key management techniques such as public key cryptography based schemes impractical. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based schemes implemented on WSN nodes such as TinyECC [3] will, for example, consume significant energy resources and even then a single operation will still take a long time to compute [4] .
Physical Layer Secure Key Generation (PL-SKG) schemes aim to address the challenges highlighted above by enabling a key to be generated and refreshed in a relatively lightweight manner [5] , [6] . They achieve this feat by exploiting the diversity and inherent randomness of the wireless channel that the physical layer is communicating over to generate keys. Another key advantage of PL-SKG schemes is that they use secondary packet information (e.g Receive Signal Strength (RSS), Link Quality Indicators (LQI), Automatic Gain Control (AGC) Information e.t.c) to generate keys. Hence, the same packets that are being exchanged during the key generation process could still be used to carry other application specific information that nodes may wish to exchange, and in so doing preserving bandwidth.
The work in this area stems primarily from initial work by Mathur et al. [7] and Kaemarungsi and Krishnamurthy [8] showing that given that there is a fading channel between two communicating parties, a common secret key could be extracted by those two parties. Following this, there have been a number of studies that looked into this issue in the WSN domain. This work has mainly consisted of looking at only mobile WSNs although work in [4] was the first to look at static channels (i.e where nodes are not moving). Despite the progress that has been made in these areas, there is still a number of limitations like unguaranteed key establishment in all environments which hamper the wide spread adoption of these schemes. Some of these issues have been addressed by the PL-SKG scheme proposed in this paper.
PL-SKG schemes usually start with a process of sampling a wireless channel and observing some physical layer parameter. After repeated observations of the parameter of interest, these schemes formulate a common key using their respective observations. However, it is likely that the keys generated by two different parties contain some disagreed bits. This key bit disagreement needs to be reconciled before the key can be used. Current state-of-the-art practical implementations for WSNs usually accomplish this task by exchanging some information that characterises the structure of the keys they have just generated. This can be a big security risk as it may allow an adversary to obtain and recover portions of the key given particular channel conditions. In addition to this, current RSS based PL-SKG schemes quantise the RSS directly which can cause key disagreements if the communicating parties are using very different transmit powers. After reconciliation, the process moves onto the privacy amplification stage where the reconciled keys are usually hashed to ensure that the key entropy is spread evenly across the entire key size. This can then be followed by a challenge-response to ensure generated cryptographic keys agree at both ends.
Motivated by the above limitations, this paper proposes a new lightweight PL-SKG protocol for static networks, which uses Error Correcting Codes (ECCs) to reconcile keys in a secure manner that does not involve leaking any information about the formulated keys. The scheme also ensures that transmit power mismatches between nodes do not hinder the key generation process by not directly using the quantised RSS values for key formulation. The scheme uses ECCs to carry out the key reconciliation process and in so doing not revealing anything about the structure of the RSS samples. This provides an improvement on current WSN PL-SKG schemes as no information that characterises the RSS samples accumulated by legitimate parties during the randomness sharing phase needs to exchanged in the key reconciliation phase.
The main novel contributions of this paper are to
• Propose a novel, robust and practical PL-SKG scheme for static WSNs, which uses ECCs to generate and/or refresh keys whilst not leaking any information to a local adversary. This is in contrast to the iterative quantisation techniques that are usually used in current WSN PL-SKG schemes.
• Highlight the many implementation issues that arise when implementing PL-SKG schemes on off-the-shelf devices. Many of these issues have not been discussed in detail in existing literature.
• Provide real PL-SKG implementation results of the proposed scheme and evaluate outcomes. This paper is structured as follows. Section II takes a look at related work. Section III gives the system and adversarial models used in our scheme. Section IV presents a broad overview of our proposed PL-SKG scheme. Sections V, VI and VII then provide detailed descriptions of our proposed PL-SKG scheme's randomness sharing, information reconciliation and privacy amplification stages, respectively. Section VIII discusses the implementation of the scheme and evaluates its outcomes. Lastly section IX ends the paper by concluding and briefly discussing further work.
II. RELATED WORK
There are a lot of challenges that face PL-SKG. The most important ones are reliability of the key generation process and susceptibility to physical layer attacks such as jamming, channel manipulation and man in the middle attacks [9] . There has been a lot of research work looking into PL-SKG in WSNs in the past few years. Most of the research focuses on using RSS as a source of randomness for practical key generation. This is most likely owing to the relative ease of getting hold of RSS information as opposed to other channel state information (CSI) such as the channel response (h) on standard 802.15.4 compliant wireless nodes.
The work in [10] and [11] considers key generation between mobile nodes using RSS as the source of common randomness and under many different topologies. It focuses on exploiting not only the wireless channel between two nodes but also the deployment environment, in which multiple nodes might be deployed, and the mobility of the nodes to generate group keys over the physical layer.
The paper [12] proposes a physical layer key generation scheme that uses nodes fitted with a special Espar antenna. The general idea is that by varying the reactances (amplitude and phase characteristics) of the Espar antennas at both ends of the communication channel, the variation of the received RSS at both ends can be induced to achieve a high key generation rate even on a static channel. This exploits not only the variation in the wireless channel but also the variation in the effective receive and transmit power that an Espar antenna experiences in the reactance domain. These variations can be exploited by building a RSS profile under different reactance values, which is used as a basis for SKG.
The main problem with using the channel response as the basis for SKG in WSNs like the above existing approaches is that the channel response will not be available to higher layers on off-the-shelf (OTS) WSN devices. This forces practical SKG schemes in WSNs to resort to using coarse measures of channel randomness such as signal received strength (RSS). Such schemes include those in [13] and [4] which generate keys over the physical layer using RSS measurements. They attempt to induce variability in static channels by switching between multiple channels centred at different frequencies. These proposed schemes have the disadvantage of requiring that the information that characterises the structure of the generated keys needs to be exchanged as part of the key reconciliation process. They also use the quantised RSS directly in the key generation process and so transmit power mismatches between communicating parties lead to high key disagreement rates. This paper aims to rectify these problems. VOLUME 6, 2018 III. SYSTEM MODEL A. WIRELESS CHANNEL MODEL PL-SKG schemes aim to generate cryptographic keys by observing the physical channel between two nodes and using the channel as a common source of randomness upon which to generate keys. The wireless channel is modelled as being comprised of two main components: i) a multiplicative fading loss h (which we will in this text just refer to as the 'channel') and ii) an additive noise component n. When a node n alice sends a symbol x to another node n bob , n bob receives a noisy signal y ab where y ab = h ab * x + n ab with * being the convolution operation. Conversely, when n bob sends x to n alice , n alice receives y ba = h ba * x + n ba [14] .
The additive noise components n ab and n ba are independent random variables, so they can not be used as a common source of randomness [15] , [16] . For a static channel, the fading components h ab and h ba stay highly correlated over a coherence bandwidth (B c ) because of the channel reciprocity principle. If the frequency used by n alice and n bob is within that band, then h ab ≈ h ba .
In the case of a non-static mobile channel, channel fading will stay highly correlated for time intervals shorter than the coherence time t c provided that the frequency remains within the band B c (where t c is directly proportional to the relative speed at which nodes move). A third node n eve which is a distance d away from n bob and receiving a noisy signal from n alice will receive y ae = h ae * x + n ae , where h ae decorrelates with respect to h ab as d increases. At a distance d ≥ λ/2 (where λ is the wavelength of the transmitted signal), it can be shown that the fading components seen by n alice and n bob will be largely independent of h ae making it impossible for n eve to estimate h ab from that position. Figure 1 shows the relationship between channels between n alice , n bob and n eve . The central idea behind PL-SKG is to utilise this channel reciprocity to generate cryptographic keys. Particularly, because the legitimate channel (h ab ) will be in deep fade at different locations to the eavesdropper channel (h ae ), n alice and n bob can use the knowledge of the channel's deep fading characteristics to generate keys.
B. ADVERSARIAL MODEL
It is important to outline the assumptions made about the adversary's computational and physical advantages just as in conventional cryptographic protocols. The adversary in this case is modelled as being active and in the reception range of all packets exchanged between n alice and n bob . The adversary, n eve , is also assumed to be at a distance greater than 2m from both n alice and n bob . If the adversary is too close to n alice and n bob then the adversary's channel might correlate with legitimate party channels. The adversary is also capable of both power limited indiscriminate jamming of the 2.4GHz spectrum and also capable of flooding the wireless channel.
Given the assumptions above, the attacker must not be able to recover the common key generated by n alice and n bob or use a compromised session key to calculate session keys that were used prior to or after the compromised session.
IV. OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED PL-SKG SCHEME
The proposed PL-SKG scheme consists of three main stages as shown in Figure 2 . These are i) randomness sharing, ii) key reconciliation, and iii) privacy amplification. In the randomness sharing phase, n alice and n bob trade N i messages over N j different frequencies. They then filter and process those samples as shown in Figure 2 to formulate an initial key.
In the key reconciliation stage, that key is reconciled using ECCs. This process involves n alice generating a random number and encoding it with an ECC. A one-time pad is then performed with the encoded random number and the key that has been generated by n alice and the result is sent over the wireless channel to n bob . n bob then processes the information received as shown in Figure 2 to reconcile its key with the key generated by n alice . After both n alice and n bob have generated the keys, the process moves on to the privacy amplification stage.
The privacy amplification stage serves two main purposes, i) to ensure perfect forward and backward security and ii) to ensure that the final key has bits which are well distributed. To achieve this goal, the privacy amplification stage formulates the key in such a way that a new session key forms a hash chain that uses both the previous key and the hashed value of the current physical layer generated key as arguments. Formulating the current session key in this manner makes it impossible for an intruder with knowledge of compromised session key K i to compute the key that was used prior to or after K i . The details of these three stages will be presented in the separate sections below.
V. RANDOMNESS SHARING & QUANTISATION
Randomness sharing is arguably the most important stage in the PL-SKG process because it is the stage when a physical layer parameter (in our case the RSS) is observed. In this section we will first look at the limitations and the implementation issues that arise when using OTS 802.15.4 compliant WSNs. We will then briefly investigate the impact that channel fading has on the variability of static WSN channels, before detailing the full procedure for randomness sharing used in our proposed PL-SKG scheme.
A. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES WITH RANDOMNESS SHARING ON REAL NODES
A WSN node consists of sensors, a transceiver and a microcontroller. A user wishing to deploy a PL-SKG scheme has the option of i) performing the entire key generation procedure in hardware within the transceiver where all the other physical layer tasks are performed, or ii) just sampling a physical layer parameter from the transceiver and using that parameter as a source of randomness for a key generation procedure taking place in the microcontroller. Opting for the former solution would mean using the transceiver with physical layer functions for key generation built in, which would hinder quick adoption and deployment of the scheme. The latter option involves employing a current 802.15.4 compliant transceiver (such as the popular CC2420 transceiver [17] used in TeloB WSN nodes) which is used in nodes to sample a physical layer variable such as the RSS and have the other stages of SKG implemented as software on the microcontroller. This approach has been the most popular one used in practical WSNs and was adopted in [4] and [10] .
The most useful and hence most intuitive channel parameter to use as a shared source of randomness between two parties is the channel response (or multiplicative fading loss) h. The channel response encapsulates the amplitude and phase changes that a transmitted signal goes through whilst travelling through the wireless medium. The channel response also has two degrees of freedom upon which to generate keysthe channel amplitude and the channel phase -and will thus yield a better key generation rate than parameters with just one degree of freedom. When trying to generate physical layer keys using OTS transceivers, the channel response will be most likely unavailable, so another parameter such as the RSS might be used instead. OTS transceivers do not compute and pass on a channel response estimate because it is not directly needed for communication to occur so it does not warrant the additional computational resources it would take to estimate and provide it. Even if the channel response was estimated and provided on a symbol-by-symbol basis, a device running at a frequency much higher than a microcontroller's frequency would be needed to sample the values.
B. SOURCES OF CHANNEL FADING IN WSNS
PL-SKG schemes rely on sampling the channel response h and thus the rate at which we can generate keys at the physical layer is limited by how much the channel varies in time, frequency and space. If a node is moving, the frequency received will differ from the frequency transmitted according to the formula 1 below because of the Doppler shift [18, p. 47] . The relationship between the receive and transmit frequencies f RX and f TX is defined below:
Here, − → v(t) is the relative velocity between the two nodes, λ is the wavelength of the transmitted wave, θ (t) is the angle of signal arrival at time t, and f MAX is the maximum Doppler shift.
This shift causes a time-varying channel and fast fading. The coherence time t c is the time interval where we have f RX ≈ f TX . In the case of mobile nodes, this variability can be exploited to generate keys by sampling the channel every t seconds where t > t c . In the case of static nodes, where − → v(t) = 0, there is no time-varying channel fading, so the channel remains largely unchanged for a long period, which reduces the key generation capacity.
There is also an opportunity to exploit the frequency selective characteristics of a channel to generate keys. Frequency selectivity is caused by the propagating environment in which the nodes are communicating and the rate at which nodes are transmitting data. Frequency selectivity when transmitting symbols over a channel is caused by multipath propagation which causes time dispersion, leading to Inter-Symbol Interference (ISI). Multipath propagation results in different copies of a signal to take different paths from a transmitter to a receiver. Since these paths are of different lengths, they arrive at the receiver at different times and cause ISI.
The coherence bandwidth is a statistical measurement of the range of frequencies over which the channel can be considered flat. The X% coherence bandwidth is defined in [19, p. 47] as being equal to the value of f such that:
Here, X is the correlation factor, h(f ) is the channel response at frequency f , |h(f )| is the channel gain and E{x} is the expectation of random variable x. The 50% and the 90% coherence bandwidth, for example, can be shown to be equal to 1/5σ τ and 1/50σ τ respectively. Here, σ τ is the delay spread.
For a channel to be very frequency selective, we usually need to have a signal bandwidth greater than the 50% channel coherence bandwidth, namely we need B s > B C,50 . In nonline-of-sight indoor WSNs we will typically have the value of σ τ in the range from ≈ 8ns to ≈18ns [20] and an allocated bandwidth of 2MHz per channel in 802.15.4 networks. Hence we can see that even if we take the most severe case of delay spread given as 18ns in [20] we have B C,50 ≈ 11 MHz. This means that just one channel does not provide enough frequency dependent variation to base key generation on, but if we use the entire spectrum of available 802.15.4 channels we can exploit the fact that each individual channel has a different frequency response to generate keys.
The above problem with static channels not having a lot of variability is a key challenge when trying to formulate PL-SKG schemes for WSNs as nodes are usually non-mobile and utilise low bandwidths. A common approach to circumventing this problem is to induce variability at the nodes by limiting the schemes to mobile nodes [10] , switching transmission channels [4] or altering hardware characteristics every time we sample the channel [12] . The presence of some frequency selective fading means that we can exploit the variability of slow fading loss (L p ) at different centre frequencies by switching between different frequency channels.
C. RANDOMNESS SHARING IN PROPOSED PL-SKG SCHEME
The scheme we propose alternatively hops between L channels according to a pre-determined frequency hopping schedule S known to both nodes n alice and n bob and computes the mean RSS on each channel at each end. In order for the nodes to generate keys they need to change their frequency channels synchronously, and the frequency hopping schedule S helps them do that. The schedule also plays an important part in ensuring that the generated keys vary with time even in static channels. Going through the key generation process multiple times in quick succession will still produce different keys because the set of channels used and the order in which they are used will change with each iteration according to the synchronised schedule S. The generation of S can be arbitrary and so legitimate parties can easily generate S by seeding a pseudo number generator and iterating it after every sample period.
After this, the samples are first processed by removing the direct current (DC) component in the samples (this involves calculating the mean of the samples and then deducting that mean from each sample value). The average value (i.e mean) of the resulting samples after this processing will then be zero. This is done so that the differences in transmit powers between n alice and n bob do not affect the key generation process. After this, each value in the resulting sequence is matched and swapped with its gray code equivalent. Converting to gray code helps minimise bit disagreement between n alice and n bob by ensuring that the difference between any two adjacent values is zero.
After this we take our bit sequence and use it to formulate a weak key. In this case we will define the weak key as the intermediate key that comes out as a result of the randomness sharing phase and is used in the key reconciliation process. If we need a longer weak key, we can change the schedule S and repeat the process above to get another longer bit sequence. We can repeat this process until we have the required number of bits in our weak key, although the longer the key required the higher the energy cost. The rationale behind formulating weak keys in this way and not just using directly quantised values is to further add resilience to transmit power differences between nodes that would otherwise cause mismatches and to increase the key variability between sessions. The randomness sharing procedure is shown in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode for Randomness Sharing Stage
Input: Channel Frequency Hopping Schedule S Result: K RS -Key from Randomness Sharing Stage
VI. INFORMATION RECONCILIATION
Information reconciliation is the process of using quantised values of a physical parameter to generate a common key between two communicating parties. This stage aims to reduce the bit errors between two communicating nodes by having the nodes share some information that would help them reconcile their keys. The main existing approaches proposed of doing this include the use of error correcting codes or the exchange of some information regarding the quantisation of keys to help reconcile keys. The former approach is popular in 802.11 networks (particularly using LDPC (Low Density Parity Check) codes (ECCs) or BCH (Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem) codes) whilst the later approach is popular in a WSN setting.
The use of the ECCs process involves n alice choosing a random number, r, encoded with an error correcting code C, performing a one-time pad with its key K a to create a syndrome S, and sending it to n bob . n bob then performs a one-time pad with its key K b to get an estimate of the encoded data and then uses it to compute K a . More formally, the above process can be defined as follows:
Alice :
Here, the bitwise ⊕ operation is the exclusive OR operation, e is the error vector and H D (a, b) is the hamming distance (i.e the number of disagreeing bits) between numbers a and b.
The choice of ECC in a WSN setting will depend on the required key length as different codes have different decoding capabilities and resource requirements. The hamming code, for example, is fairly easier than other resource intensive codes such as LDPC codes to implement but it will only have a decoding threshold of t = (d min − 1)/2, where d min is the minimum distance between codes, whilst LDPC codes can correct many more errors as the key size increases but consumes more resources because of its iterative decoding process.
The chosen ECC needs to be able to correct errors but it should not be able to correct a large number of errors. If the ECC can correct a large number of errors then it may be possible for n eve to reconcile its key with n alice even though the difference between their keys is fairly large. Hamming and Polynomial codes have the advantage of having a clearly defined error correcting capability, so we know that they will only be able correct errors up to a fixed threshold. Polynomial codes are similar to hamming codes in terms of both error correction capability and resource intensiveness, so we propose the use of either hamming codes or polynomial codes for error correction.
Polynomial codes create a codeword c(x) by using the original message vector m(x) and a primitive polynomial g(x), where c(x), m(x) and g(x) are all in polynomials with coefficients belonging to the Galois field of two elements (i.e GF(2)). The code can correct one bit error in the received message r(x) by computing the remainder after dividing r(x) with g(x). This can be seen below:
Here, e(x) is the error monomial. The set of all values of rem
for all i (i.e. for all error monomials) is precomputed and stored in a look-up table and thus the error location i can be computed at the receiver provided only a one bit error has occurred. VOLUME 6, 2018 A hamming code is specified by a generator matrix G and a parity check matrix H such that HG T = 0. The code is computed as c = mG and the received vector r = c + e is decoded by first computing a value called the syndrome, s, by s = Hr T and comparing which column of parity check matrix H matches with s. Here, the message vector is m and the error vector is e. The matched column is the error location of the single bit error. If s = 0, then there is no error. A polynomial code with a message length k and a code length n can be represented as a cyclic hamming code by setting:
The design of our proposed scheme uses a series of Hamming codes with an additional parity bit with a code length of n = 8 and message length k = 4 to achieve error correction. Using a small code length helps keep the complexity of the key reconciliation stage low. The key is first interleaved by using a (4 × 8) block interleaver before encoding. Interleaving is used in order to make the ECC more robust to burst errors so the scheme works even if a particular segment of the key has a high density of errors. The interleaved key is first divided into n chunks, and each chunk is then padded with a Hamming code encoded random bit sequence (C(r)) to form a set of syndromes. Afterwards, these syndromes are then sent from node n alice to node n bob for n bob to carry out key reconciliation. When n bob first receives the set of syndromes, n bob performs the following for each syndrome. n bob first tries to recover the original encoded key segment by performing a one time pad of the received syndrome with the key that n bob has measured. After performing this operation, n bob will obtain the original encoded random number with H D (e, 0) errors, where e is the error vector (K a ⊕ K b ).
Using the error vector e, n bob can then recover the original error free encoded random sequence C(r) by decoding C(r)⊕e to get r and then encoding the result to recover C(r). After this, the key measured by n alice can be recovered by computing C(r)⊕s. The random number, r (which is encoded to create C (r)), is generated using the Park-Miller Minimal Standard Generator. The Park-Miller Minimal Standard Generator is a multiplicative linear congruential generator (r = (a × s) mod (2 31 − 1)) with a = 16007 and the initial seed value s sourced by our scheme from the lower bits of the transceiver's automatic gain control (AGC) magnitude register (the transceiver datasheet specifies that these lower bits can be used for random number generation). After error correction both n alice and n bob can then proceed to the privacy amplification stage.
VII. PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
The general idea behind privacy amplification is to ensure that if the number of bits in the key generated after reconciliation by a key generation scheme is greater than the entropy of the key, we need to adjust the size of the key so that it aligns well with the entropy of the key. Take for example the following reconciled 32 bit key, K AB , that was quantised by looking at the number of deep fades that a chip sequence experienced whilst travelling over a channel (deep fade = 0):
Here, H (K AB ) is the entropy of K AB . So we need to have the key to be of length l ≈ H (K AB ) < length(K AB ) for the key to have a level of cryptographic security that corresponds to its length. This can be done by using privacy extractors or by hashing the long key and choosing the first n bits of H (K AB ) as the final key K AMP .
The calculations above assume n eve observes a completely decorrelated channel from n alice and n bob . In order to evaluate n we would need to know n eve 's channel statistics and thus in our scheme we take n as being equal to length(K AB ) meaning that the resultant generated key will have a length that is longer than its true entropy. This keeps the complexity and hence the computational cost low. In our proposed key generation scheme, we propose that the privacy amplification should be done in a way that the generated keys refresh the current session key to formulate the next session key and in so doing form a hashed key chain. In other words, a physical layer generated key in this time instance is a function of all the previous keys that have ever been generated. This can be achieved by computing the final key K i AB using the previous session key K i−1 AB , reconciled weak key k i w , the recovered random number r and the iteration number i as:
Here, f i is a hash chain of reconciled weak keys, with f 0 = h(k 0 w ). f i is used to ensure that only a node with knowledge of all previous key generation sessions can generate the next session key. After n alice and n bob have derived a key, challenge-response authentication can then be undertaken to make sure the two generated keys agree. If the two keys do not agree then key generation can be attempted again. This will prevent key error propagation, where one error leads to more errors in the subsequent keys. The derived K i AB can then be used for communication between n alice and n bob .
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION, EVALUATION AND COMPARISION
In order to evaluate the practicality of our proposed PL-SKG scheme and compare it with the most relevant existing method in [4] as will be elaborated later, we have implemented them using the NesC language [21] on a pair of TelosB WSN nodes running the TinyOS operating system. Experiments in a lineof-sight (LOS), indoor office setting were run over a number of distances and at a number of transmit power levels in order for the correlation between these factors and the Successful Key Reconciliation (SKR) to be evaluated. The nodes were static during the key generation process and the environment was an office working environment. The RSS values used are the ones measured and reported by the CC2420 transceiver that constitute the TelosB nodes under test. The CC2420 has a stated RSS dynamic range of 100dB and a stated RSS accuracy of ±6dB with RSS linearity of ±3dB. The graphs showing the observed SKR vs distance relations can be seen in Figures 3 -4 . The graphs also show the distance between nodes versus the SKR rate at different transmit powers. Each curve in the graphs is a third order polynomial best fit curve of the data points. From the graphs, it is clear to see that the SKR is very high (near 100%) at short distances but decreases with the distance and also decreases with lower node transmit powers. These results show that PL-SKG can be a suitable alternative for the implementation of soft key generation in WSN nodes. In particular, a key can be generated and used to refresh session keys of a WSN node and in so doing help to enforce the forward security of the WSN node. This would make it very hard for an attacker who does not have all the keys generated over all previous key generation sessions to discover the current key.
As the distance between n alice and n bob increases, the signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio at the receiving end decreases. This decrease in SNR makes the estimation of the reciprocal component of the channel (and hence the RSS) harder. From the RSS we have RSS ≈ P r +P n ±3. Here the ±3 dB component is due to the stated linearity in the calculation of RSS on the TelosB's transceiver [17] . As the distance increases (or the transmit power reduces) the receive power (P r ) reduces. This reduction in P r causes the share of the non-reciprocal component of the RSS (P n ± 3) to increase as a proportion of the total RSS. This then causes bigger disagreements in measured RSS between n alice and n bob . This then reduces the SKR rate. This is clearly visible by looking at the shapes of the curves in Figures 3 -4 .
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed PL-SKG scheme, we have implemented the most relevant and representative PL-SKG scheme for WSNs, which is the scheme in [4] , for comparison. Current state-of-the-art PL-SKG schemes for WSNs usually use a form of iterative quantisation to achieve key reconciliation. A popular representative example is the scheme proposed in [4] . Its key reconcilement proceeds as follows. n alice chooses a value t called the tolerance value and then quantises the observed RSS samples with a quantisation level of L = 2t (i.e. rounds off each sample to the nearest multiple of L). Node n alice then sends the quantised values, the tolerance and the difference between the quantised values and the observed values to n bob . n bob then uses the information it has received to quantise and then reconcile its key with n alice .
After the key reconcilliation stage n alice and n bob trade a challenge-response message to ascertain if they have successfully generated a common key. If the challenge-response fails, the value of L is incremented and the key generation process then loops back to the beginning key reconciliation stage. This means that the quantisation interval is increased with each iteration. This process continues until n alice and n bob establish a common cryptographic key.
The PL-SKG scheme proposed in [4] was implemented and experiments were conducted with the quantisation interval fixed at L, where L ∈ {3, 4}. The results of the experiments are shown alongside the results of the proposed scheme in Figures 3 -4 . From the graphs it is clear that the proposed scheme performs better than the scheme in [4] for L = 3 but slightly underperforms [4] for L = 4. The scheme proposed in [4] (and other similar iterative quantisation PL-SKG schemes) generally perform better as L is increased but in the following section we will prove that increasing values of L in these schemes reduce key entropy and thus stand to compromise security.
There have been a few proposed key generation schemes over the past few years such as the one in [4] but our scheme differs substantially from all the other practical schemes for WSN nodes in a number of ways. Firstly, the biggest difference is the use of ECCs to improve the error correcting capability of key generation. ECCs have been proposed by a number of papers for 802.11 networks but no practical implementation of the approach has surfaced in the 802.15.4 landscape. The use of ECCs improves the scheme in a number of ways. It allows the key reconciliation layer to be designed and benchmarked separately to give a true layered design approach. It also allows different ECCs to be removed and placed depending on the power of the WSN node in question. For example, if a more powerful WSN node is used, the designer might opt to replace the hamming code used in our scheme with a slightly more powerful ECC without running the risk of breaking the system. Secondly, unlike the other schemes, our approach does not quantise the RSS samples directly, so a mismatch with the transmit power does not alter the key generation capability. The only thing that matters in the key generation is the high frequency components (the movements in the RSS sequence) but not the DC component (the average RSS). This means that nodes do not have to be set to the exact same transmit power in the channel sampling stage for successful key generation and refreshment to occur.
Thirdly, the scheme provides a mechanism on which to generate new keys which uses not only the current state of the physical layer but also previous session keys (and hence indirectly using previous physical layer states). This helps make the scheme forward and backward secure.
In other 802.15.4 PHY layer schemes such as in [4] , a single bit disagreement in the quantised RSS samples causes the final key to disagree. These schemes combat this by increasing the distance between quantisation levels until the two keys agree, with no limit on how much the maximum distance can be. This poses a security risk as the distance between quantisation levels could potentially get very big. In our scheme, errors are corrected a lot more efficiently with the exact capability of the error decoding process being clearly quantifiable.
IX. SECURITY ANALYSIS A. SECURITY COMPARISON OF KEY RECONCILIATION IN PROPOSED SCHEME AND STATE-OF-THE-ART PL-SKG SCHEMES
In this subsection we show that using iterative reconciliation is inefficient and potentially insecure because the entropy of a sequence quantised with quantisation level L (X L ) is lower than the entropy of the original observed sequence (X ). To do this we need to derive and analyse the value of α L for increasing L, where we define α L as the ratio defined in 9 below. The ratio of H (X ) to H (X L ) should be 1 to α L .
We first begin by getting an expression for α L for the case where X is drawn from a uniform distribution. After this, we will proceed to deriving α L in the general case and then finally provide an expression of α L in the case where the X are RSS values sampled from the RSS channel. In all cases we will prove that α L is less 1 and hence the entropy of the generated key inversely proportional to L.
In the case where X is drawn from a uniform distribution and X is the set of all possible outputs (i.e the range of X). The number of elements in X is the cardinality of X (|X |). The entropy of X can be evaluated as:
where p(x) = probability distribution of x. The quantisation operation rounds off values into the nearest multiple of L and so it maps X to a set we denote as X L . This means that the number of elements in
This then implies that α L = (1 − log |X | L) < 1 for the case when X is drawn from a uniform distribution. The fact that α L will always be less than 1 is due to the fact that |X | > L > 1, which causes the value of log |X | L to always take a value in the range (0,1).
To get the expression of α L in the general case we first define an integer 
The probability distribution over the set X L is p L (x), where p L (x) can be calculated from p(x) using 13. We can then calculate the value of H (X L ) as shown in 14 and 15. 
The fact that α L is less than 1 is a consequence of the mathematical inequality shown in 17. This proves that quantisation will always reduce entropy of the original sequence, with the ratio of the original entropy to the quantised entropy being 1 :
To illustrate this point, a graphical representation of this phenomenon is shown in figure 5 . Figure 5 shows a sequence of integers in the range [−4, 4] and graphs that result from the quantisation of the sequence with L = {2, 3, 4}. From the graphs it is clear to see how using large quantisation intervals is detrimental to security as the entropy and hence the sequence variability of quantised signal is dramatically reduced. The linear received signal power is log-normally distributed [22] and so its discrete form can be approximated by the log binomial distribution [23] . The probability distribution p(x = i) = P i in the case when the RSS is what we are sampling can thus be expressed as follows:
where n = Number of RSS samples
The standard deviation (σ ) varies depending on the exact wireless communication environment but empirical studies have estimated σ to be in the range of 5 to 12dB depending on the environment [24] . The analysis above shows that iterative quantisation will negatively affect entropy with increasing L, with the rate at which entropy degrades not only being a function of L but also dependent on the actual probability distribution of RSS values. This is in contrast to ECC based reconciliation which forces node n bob to reconcile its key to the original key measured by node n alice and so does not necessarily reduce the entropy of the key in the reconcilement stage.
B. RANDOMNESS TESTING
In order for keys to be used for cryptographic processes it must be ensured that the generated keys have properties of randomness. The randomness of the generated keys was tested using the discrete frequency spectrum test, which is a part of a standardised cryptographic randomness test [25] .
The spectral test works by taking the discrete fourier transform (DFT) of a bit stream and testing if the spectrum is similar with the spectrum that would be obtained from a perfect true randomness source. If a sequence is truly random, then its spectrum will approximately be flat because there will be no dominant frequency components. In addition to this, if a spectrum is random, then 95% of the frequency domain samples will be less than a threshold T where T = √ n log(20) and n is the length of the sequence. The test works by first calculating N r , the mean number of samples in the spectrum that would be below T in a truly random sequence and N s , the number of samples in the spectrum that are below T in the sequence under test. The probability that the sequence under test is truly random is then calculated using the deviation of N s from N r . If that probability is over 99%, then sequence under test is deemed to be random [25] . The test proceeds as follows: 
where
erf(u) = 1 2π
A small p-value indicates strong evidence against our null hypothesis (our null hypothesis is that the sequence under test is random). The NIST standard advises to accept a sequence with a p-value greater than 0.01 as being random [25] . In order to test randomness, 75 different keys were computed and used to form a bit sequence of length 2400 bits. The sequence was then tested using the spectral test. The obtained spectrum can be seen in figure 6 . The resultant p-value of the tested bit stream was 0.589 which means the sequence has randomness properties. The keys were also tested to see if they are well correlated in a static environment. In this test, 75 keys were computed with a key refreshment period of one minute. For each key, the correlation between itself and each of the other keys was computed and the result plotted on the heat map shown in figure 7 . The correlation coefficient between two keys is obtained by computing the cross correlation between the keys and then taking the maximum correlation coefficient (CC) from the resultant vector (this can be seen in 31). From figure 7 it is clear that different keys do not correlate highly with each other between sessions on the vast majority of occasions. The points in the map are keys which were generated by legitimate parties n alice and n bob in the same session. Out of all key correlations, there is only one rare occassion when subsequent generated keys correlated highly and only one other case of high correlation between key number 4 and key number 9. These relatively rare high correlations could have been caused by channel conditions not changing adequately enough between key generation intervals.
(32)
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS AGAINST COMMON ATTACKS
It is also important to evaluate the security of the scheme in order to understand the additional security benefits that our scheme brings in relation to existing key refreshment and generation schemes. The biggest threat facing sensor networks is arguably brought about by the fairly recent drive to connect them to the internet to create what is known as the internet of things (IoT). Connecting devices in this way leaves WSNs (which can have indirect access to the internet via sinks / base stations) vulnerable to a wide range of attacks from remote users who have access to much more powerful computational resources.
It is important that we make sure that if the key material that was originally deployed with the WSN and/or key material used in a particular session is compromised by a remote user, that user can not use that information to discover any key material used in any other session. In other words, we want our scheme to achieve perfect forward and backward security.
A type of attack that WSNs are particularly vulnerable to are man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. The most direct way an adversary could try and compromise the process is by trying to snoop on communications between n alice and n bob and then running going through the key generation process to generate a key. Tests were done with a third node, n eve , being a distance of 2m away from n bob . n alice and n bob went through the key generation process 75 times with n eve also trying to generate a key from messages sent from n alice . The correlation coefficient of the keys obtained from n bob and n eve are shown in figure 8 . From the figure it is clear that the correlation between keys generated at n alice and n eve was not high, showing that this scheme can be used even in relatively dense WSN deployments. The case outlined above is the case where n eve is passive. In an active case, n eve will try and inject/broadcast to n alice and/or n bob . In this case, allowing only packets that have been appended with a message authentication code (MAC) to be used in the key reconciliation process will prevent malicious packets from being injected by n eve . In the event that n eve tries to influence the wireless environment by flooding the channel with malicious packets and in so doing raising the RSS of received packets received in particular time intervals, n alice and n bob need to monitor the quality of the link between them by looking at the link quality indicator. An increase in RSS should correspond to an increase in LQI, so any inverse relationship between RSS and LQI will indicate some possible malicious activity.
There is also the possibility of an adversary trying to disrupt the process by jamming the wireless channel. This could be done in two ways, i) the jammer might just jam the particular 802.15.4 channel being transmitted on by transmitting high power noise or ii) the attacker could flood the channel with 802.15.4 compliant packets. In the first case the 2.4GHz 802.15.4 PHY layer provides an inbuilt defence for this using direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) technology. DSSS works by encoding the bits to be sent with another pseudo random spreading bit sequence of a substantially higher data rate than the data sequence and then transmitting the result instead of transmitting the bits directly. Doing this has the effect of spreading the information sent over a large bandwidth and in so doing preventing narrowband indiscriminate jammers.
In the event of an adversary flooding the channel with 802.15.4 compliant packets, the use of DSSS will not prevent the attack. Relying on the MAC only will not prevent the attack as each malicious packet will need to be received, leading to denial of service. In this case of the attack, actions need to be taken at the physical layer to minimise the impact. When the PHY layer transmits a packet, it prepends the packet with a synchronisation (SYNC) header. The header does not contain any application specific information, it is used to make sure the transceiver's communicating can synchronise before the actual packet information starts. The SYNC header used in the CC2420 is shown in Fig 9 . In order to minimise the impact of flooding attacks, legitimate parties could switch from the default 802.15.4 synchronisation header value of 0x00007A and use a different header unique value on a per packet basis when generating keys. A unique SYNC header value will prevent flooding attacks because packet information (e.g destination address, packet length etc.) will not even be read if the expected SYNC header preamble and received SYNC header preamble differ by more than a set threshold of bits (this threshold is configurable on the transceiver). The SYNC value is sent as plaintext and so would need to change synchronously on a per packet basis in order to foil attacks from sophisticated denial of service attackers who are snooping on SYNC headers and also flooding at the same time.
We now consider another attack scenario where the current session key is K j and an adversary compromises the key material from a previous session K i . If we had just hashed the key (together with other deterministic information) when moving to new sessions in order to refresh keys, as is the case with current WSN deployments, then session keys that were used before K i would not be computable because a hash is irreversible but all session keys that come after K i (including K j ) could be easily computed from K i by just applying successive hashes. This is a major problem because if any time in the future the original key material K 0 that the VOLUME 6, 2018 WSN was deployed with is compromised, then all the session keys that have ever been used would be at risk. If, on the other hand, our proposed scheme is used, then the compromise of any session key will not compromise any other session key as the adversary will not be able to evaluate the physical layer values that were used to refresh session keys. This is because the adversary would have no access to the values of f i in 8. A big advantage of a PL-SKG scheme is that an adversary who has not been locally there throughout the entire lifespan of the WSN network will find it very difficult to compromise a key, even if they know all the key information loaded on nodes at deployment.
X. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
This paper has discussed and highlighted the key challenges that are faced when trying to design and implement PL-SKG schemes on WSNs. We have shown that there still exist opportunities to increase the key generation rates of current schemes by exploiting the fading characteristics of chips over communication channels. We have also proposed a novel PL-SKG scheme and implemented it on real nodes enabling two parties to generate and refresh pair-wise keys. Experiments have shown that the proposed PL-SKG scheme has a high key agreement rate and that the generated key decorrelates quickly with respect to distance.
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